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GENERAL DYNAMICS OOllrORATION (0. Corporation), 
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. COUNTY OF LOS AN-
GELES et aI., Appellants; UNI'l'ED STATES OF 
AMERICA, Intervener and Respondent. 
[L. A. No. 24819. In Bank. Oct. 24, 1958.] 
AEROJET-GENERAL CORPORATION (a Corporation), 
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. COUNTY OF LOS AN-
GELES et aI., Appellants; UNITED S'l'ATES OF 
AMERICA, Intervener and Respondent. 
[1] 'laxation-Exemptions-Federal Property-Oontraetors With 
United States.-A private contractor's right to use government 
property may be the subject of a nondiscriminatory tax meas-
ured by the value of the property used, though the economic 
burden of the tax falls on the United States. 
[2] Id.-Exemptions-Possessory Interests in Exempt Property.-
A state may impose a tax on a privately held possessory 
interest in tax exempt property measured by the value of that 
interest. 
[3] Id.-Subjects of 'laxation-Personal Property.-With respect 
to personal property, the general provisions of Const., art. 
XIII, § 1, and Rev. & Tax. Code, § 201, providing that "all" 
property not exempt from taxation is subject to taxation, 
are controlled by other constitutional and statutory provisions. 
[4] Id.-Bubjects of Taxation-Personal Property.-Under Const., 
art XIII, § 14, the Legislature has power to provide for the 
taxation of "all forms of tangible personal property" and 
"any legal or equitable interest therein," but it has not pro-
vided for the taxation of limited interests in tangible personal 
property and has not defined personal property as including 
a right to its possession, as it has defined real property (Rev. 
& Tax. Code, §§ 104, 107). -
[5] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Personal Property. - Although 
taxable property may be assessed to a mere possessor (Rev. & 
Tax. Code, § 405) and such possessor is required to file a 
statement of his possession (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 442), the 
[1] See Oal.Jm., Taxation, § 77; Am.Jm., Taxation, § 218. 
[3] See Oal.Jur., Taxation, § 63; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 419. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,10,11] Taxation, ~ 86.1; (2) Taxation, 
§79(1); [3,4,8,9) Taxation, §43; [5] Taxation, §190; [6,7,12-
14] Taxation, § 159. 
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property is assessed at "its full cash value" (Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§ 401) and is listed ou the assessment roll as personal prop- , 
erty, not as a possessory interest therein. 
[6] Id.-Assessment-Persons Assessed.-Under Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§ 012, providing that when a person IS assessed as agent, 
trustee, bailee, guardian, executor or administrator, his repre-
sentative designation shall be added to his name and the 
assessment entered separately from his individual assessment. 
the assessee is liable for taxes assessed against him only in his 
representative capacity. 
[7] IeL-Assessment-Persons Assessed.-If property held by n 
bailee is tax exempt, any assessment of it would necessarily 
be self-defeating since the tax could not be enforced against 
the property or its possessor personally, at least in cases where 
the bailee's interest in the property could not "be transferred. 
[8] IeL-Subjects of Taxation-Personal Property.-From an eco-
nomic viewpoint a bailee's right to use. tax exempt personal 
property may be as valuable as the right to use tax exempt real 
property, but possessory interests in tangible personal property 
are not taxable property. 
[9] IeL-8ubjects of Taxation-Personal Property.-The right to 
obtain an economic benefit from the use or possession of prop-
erty may be a relevant consideration in determining who is 
actually its owner for tax purposes in doubtful eases, but the 
existence of such right is not controlling. 
[10] IeL - Exemptions - Federal Property - Contractors With 
United States.-With reference to personal property used in 
research and production contracts relating to national defense, 
though in one case the government may supply tools and 
material already owned by it, whereas in another it requires 
the contractor to acquire tools and material that immediately 
become government property, and in still another title remains 
in the contractor until the goods are delivered and the tools 
disposed of, these considerations may not be relevant to the 
application of a tax on the use or possession of property, but 
they are not irrelevant to the application of an ad valorem tax 
on the property itself. 
[11] Id. - Exemptions - Federal Property - Contractors With 
'United States.-Although in a given ease the impact of a use 
tax and a property tax might appear identical, they are not 
the same thing, and a property tax on tools and Dlaterial used 
in research and production contracts relating to national de-
fense cannot be sustained on the ground that the Legislature 
could constitutionally provide for the levy of a tax of equal 
amount nnder a diiIerent scheme; to be valid a use or posses-
[6] See Cal.Jur., Taxation, §'169 et seq.; Am.Jur., Taxation, 
§ 681 et seq. 
Oct.1958J GENERAL DYNAMJCtl CORI'. 11. -COUNTY OF L. A. .(;1 
151 C.2d 5D; 330 P.2d 194) 
sion tax 'would have to apply to all tax exempt property 80 as 
not to discriminate against the prh'ate use or pOl;session of 
property oWlled by the United States, and it is for the Legisll\-
ture, not the court, to determine whether ~uch a nondiscrimina-
tory tax on possessory interests in tax exempt personal prop· 
erty should be adopted and to determine the measure of such 
tax. 
[12] Id.':-Assessment-Persons Assessed-Owner.-A title clause 
in a contract vesting title in the United States is not conclusive 
of ownership for tax purposes when it appears that the tax-
payer retains the essential indicia of ownership or that the 
government title is for security only. 
[13] Id.-Assessment-PersoDS Assessed-Owner.-In the case of 
property supplied by the government and property to which 
it took title under cost-plus-fixed-fec contracts providing that 
title to personal property acquired by the contractor passed 
to the government on delivery to the contractor when pur-
chased by the contractor for performance of the contract, and 
when not so purchased, on the allocation thereof to the contract 
by commencement by the contractor of processing or use there-
of or otherwise, the contractor retaining no beneficial interest 
other than the rigllt of use in carrying out its contract, the 
contractor neither secured nor retained the essential indicia of 
ownership and was therefore not the owner for tax purposes. 
This also applied to government property supplied under sep-
arate agreements for use by the contractors generally in 
performing their contracts and to government property sup-
plied for performing fixed-price contracts. 
[14] Id.-Assessment-PersoDS Assessed-Owner.-Under normal 
operations the distinction between the treatment of contractor-
acquired property under fixed-price contracts with the govern-
ment and government supplied property under fixed-fee con-
tracts is that in the former case the contractor has the right 
to dispose of or receive title to property no lODger useful or 
necessary in the performance of the contract, whereas in the 
latter case the government retains such rights; in the former 
the risk of loss is borne by the contractor, and in the latter by 
the government. These distinctions are not inconsistent with 
the government's ownership of the property during the period 
when title was vested in it; placing the risk of loss on the 
contractor benefits the government, not the contractor, and is 
not by itself inconsistent with government ownership. 
APPEALS from judgments of the Sup~rior Court of Los 
Augell's County. Vernon W. Bunt, Judge pro tem.- Af-
firmed. 
• A8siped b1 Chairman of J'udieial 00UDCll. 
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Actions to recover county and city ad valorem personal 
property taxes. JUdgments for plaintiffs and intervener, af- I 
firmed. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, Gordon Boller, As-
oifltnnt County Oounsel, Alfn:c.l Charles DeFlon, Deputy 
County Counsel, 'Villiam R. ::MacDougall, James Don Keller, 
Distriet Attorney and County Counsel (San Diego), Carroll 
II: Smith, Deputy, Ray T. Sullivan, Jr., County Counsel 
(Hiverside), Albert E. Weller, County Counsel (San Bernar-
dino), J. Frank Coakley, District Attorney (Alameda), 
Francis W. Collins, District Attorney (Contra Costa), Keith 
C. Sorenson, District Attorney (San Mateo), Spencer M. 
Williams, County Counsel (Santa Clara), Roy A. Gustafson, 
Distriet Attorney (Ventura), John B. Heinrich, County 
Counsel (Sacramento), Roy J. Gargano, County Counsel 
(Kern), Robert M. Walsh, County Counsel (Fresno), Fred-
erick N. Reyland, Jr., County Counsel (Stanislaus), Auten 
F. Bush, City Attorney (EI Segundo), Frank L. Perry, City 
Attorney (Redondo Beach), Ferdinand P. Palla, City At-
torney (San Jose), J. F. DuPaul, City Attorney (San Diego), 
Manuel L. Cugler, City Attorney (Chula Vista), and Arlo E. 
Rickett, City Attorney (Pomona), for Appellants. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, James E. Sabine, 
Assistant Attorney General, Ernest P. Goodman, Deputy At-
torney General, Dixwell L. Pierce and R()bert G. Hamlin as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellants. 
Robert B. Watts, John Conway McDevitt, Gray, Cary, Ames 
& Frye, John M. Cranston, Ward W. Waddell, Jr., William J. 
Donahue, Hill, Farrer & Burrill, Carl A. Stutsman, Jr., Mark 
E. True and Vineent C. Page for Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
Charles K. Rice, Assistant Attorney General (United 
States), Joseph F. Goetten, A. F. Prescott and H. Eugene 
Heine, Jr., Attorneys, Department of Justice, Laughlin E. 
'Vaters, United States Attorney, and Edward R. McHale, 
Assistant United States Attorney for Intervener and Re-
spondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs, General Dynamics Corporation 
and Aerojet-General Corporation, brought these actions to 
recover county and city ad valorem personal property taxes 
) 
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for t.hf1 fhw.al YPRr 1953-J954. Thl'y aAA~rt, thRt. they had no 
taxable interest in the prollcrty. The Unit.ed States inter-
vened and alleged that the property ass(!ssrd b~longed to it 
and that it was obligated by contract to reimburse plaintiffs 
for the taxes paid. The trial court entered judgments for 
plaintiffs and intervener, and defendants appeal. 
On the first Monday in March, 1953, plaintiffs were per-
forming various research and production contracts relating 
to national defense. Some were prime contracts with the 
armed services, and others were subcontracts. Some were 
::fixed-price contracts, and others were cost-plus-a-::fixed-fee 
contracts. Aerojet operated its own plant, and General Dy-
namics operated a plant owned by the United States Navy. 
The tax on General Dynamics' possessory interest in this real 
property is not in is$ue here. 
Under the terms of the contracts, title to all of the personal 
property involved was in the United States on tax day. It 
comprised tools and equipment used in producing goods or 
carrying out research for the armed forces, materials being 
fabricated into products to be delivered to the armed forces, 
and property held on a standby basis for use in the event of 
increased defense research or production. , 
Defendants contend that plaintiffs had taxable possessory 
interests in this government-owned personal property. They 
now concede, however, that the method of evaluation adopted 
by the assessor was erroneous and therefore seek a reversal 
of the judgment with appropriate directions for correctly 
evaluating and taxing plaintiffs' interests. 
[1] It is now settled that a private contractor's right to 
use government property may be made the subject of a non-
discriminatory tax measured by the value of the property used 
even though the economic burden of the tax faUs on the 
United States. (City of Detroit v. Murray Corp. of America, 
355 U.S. 489 [78 S.Ct. 458, 486, 2 L.Ed.2d 441, 460] ; United 
States v. City of Detroit, 355 U,.s.'466 [78 S.Ot. 474, 2 L.Ed. 
2d 424]; United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 
484 [78 S.Ot. 483, 2 L.Ed.2d 436].) [2] .A. fortiori, a state 
lnay stop short of imposing such a tax and impose a tax on a 
privately held possessory interest in tax exempt property 
measured by the value of that interest. (Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 
30 Ca1.2d 610 [184 P .2d 879].) The first question in these 
cases is whether the state has done so. ' 
Defendants contend that there is no logical distinction be-
tween possessory interests in r(,:11 alld personal property. They 
) 
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poiut 011t that. possessory intert"Rts in real property are taxable 
(Dr 1,11: "o.",r.(, lnr. v. Cou1Ify of Bnn Di('40, 45 Ca1.2d 546 
L290 P.2d 544] ; Kai.scr Co. v. Rrid, 30 Ca1.2d 610 [184 P.2d 
879]; Rev. & Tax. Code, § ]04) and invokf' 1W('.t.ion 1 of· 1 
article XIII of the California Constitution and Revenue and , 
Taxation Code, section 201, as establishing the same rule with . 
respect to personal property. 
[3] Section 1 of article XIII provides that" All property 
in the State except as otherwise in this Constitution provided, 
not exempt under the laws of the United States, shall be' 
taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided 
by law, or as hereinafter provided. The word 'property,' as 
used in this article and section, is hereby declared to include 
moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, dues, franchises, and all other 
matters and things, real, personal, and mixed, capable of 
private ownership. . • ." Section 201 provides that "All 
property in .this State, not exempt under the laws of the United 
States or of this State, is subject to taxation under this code.' I 
With respect to personal property, however, these general 
provisions are controlled by other constitutional and statutory 
provisions dealing expressly with the taxation of personal 
property and interests therein. 
[4] Section 14 of article XIII provides in part that "The 
Legislature shall have the power to provide for the assessment, 
levy and collection of taxes upon all forms of tangible per-
sonal property, all notes, debentures, shares of capital stock, 
bonds, solvent credits, deeds of trust, mortgages, and any legal 
or equitable interest therein, not exempt from taxation under 
the provisions of this Constitution, in such manner, and at 
such rates, as may be provided by law, and in pursuance of 
the exercise of such power the Legislature, two-thirds of all 
of the members electcd to each of the two houses voting in 
favor thereof, may classify any and all kinds of personal prop-
erty for the purposes of assessment and taxation in a manner 
and at a rate or rates in proportion to value diiferent from 
any other property in this State subject to taxation and may 
t"xempt entirely from taxation any or all forms, types or 
classes of personal property." 
Under these provisions the Legislature may provide for 
the taxation of "all forms of tangible personal property" and 
"any legal or equitable interest therein." We have con-
cluded, however, that the Legislature has not provided for 
the taxation of limited interests in tangible personal property. 
It has not defined personal property as including a right to 
.... "'" 
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its possP~<iSion as it bas real property (see R.ev. & Tax. Code, 
§§ 104, 107), and this omission reflects not merely a lack of 
detail, but a consistent pattern of taxing tangible personal 
property as an entity or not at all. 
[~] Although taxable property may be assessed to a mere 
possessor (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 405; S. & G. GU'1llP Co. v. City 
0: County of .san Francisco, 18 Ca1.2d 129, 131 [114 P.2d 346, 
135 A.L.R. 595]) and such a possessor is required to file a 
statement of his possession (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 442), the 
property is assessed at "its full cash value" (Rev. & Tax. 
Code, § 401) and is listed on the assessment roll as personal 
property and not as a possessory interest therein.- No pro-
vision is made for declaring or assessing a possessory interest 
in tax exempt personal property. [6] Moreover, section 612 
provides that when •• a person is assessed as agent, trustee, 
bailee, guardian, executor, or administrator, his representative 
designation shall be added to his name, and the assessment 
entered separately from his individual assessment." (Italics 
added.) The assessee is liable for taxes assessed against him 
under this section only in his representative capacity. (County 
of Los Angeles v. Morrison, 15 Cal.2d 368, 371-373 [101 P.2d 
470, 129 A.L.R. 443].) [7] Accordingly, if the property 
held in such capacity is tax exempt, any assessment of it would 
necessarily be self-defeating for the tax could not be enforced 
against the property or its possessor personally, at least in 
cases such as these, where the bailee's interest in the property 
could not be transferred. 
[8] It is true that from an economic viewpoint a bailee's 
right to use tax exempt personal property may be as valuable 
as the right to use tax exempt real property. In construing 
ad valorem tax legislation, however, we cannot overlook the 
historical distinction between real and personal property that 
is reflected not only in the statutory provisions but in common 
·Revenue and Taxation Code, section 602, provides that the "local 
roll lhall MOW: 
II (a) The name and address, if known of the assessee. 
"(b) Land, by legal description. 
"(e) A. description of possessory interests suffieient to identify them. 
[Section 107 confines IUch interests to interests in real property.) 
"(d) Personal property •••• 
II (e) The eash value of real estate, exeept improvements • 
•• (f) The eash value of improvements on the real estate. 
. . . . . . . . 
•• (h) The eash value of possessory interests. 
fI (i) The eaah value of personal property, other than intaneiblee . 
. " 
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l1ndrrslllnding of what. sort or intf'rest in property is necessary 
to rJlwli ry as }Jropf'rly itself wit.hin the meaning of tax 
statutc!;. The distinction was recognized in 1{oiscr Co. v. Reid, 
30 Ca1.2d 610 [184 P.2d 879], and it was held in both Douglas 
Aircraft CO. Y. EYl"afn, 57 0al.App.2d ::H1 l134 P.2d 15], and 
C. C. Moore &- Co., Enginccrs v. Quinl1, 149 Cal.App.2d 666 I 
[308 }>.2d 781], that possessory interests in tangible personal 
property were 110t taxable property. Timm Ail'craft Corp. Y. 
Byram, 34 Ca1.2d 632 [213 P.2d 715], is not to the contrary 
for in that case the court concluded that the taxpayer was 
in fact the owner of the funds involved. The Timm case is 
consistent with the theory that it is the property rather thau 
interests therein that is the subject of the tax, for the tax was 
sustained on the ground that the property was owned by 
the taxpayer, not the United States. 
[9] The right to obtain an economic benefit from the use 
or possession of property may be a relevant consideration in 
determining WllO is actually its owner for tax purposes in 
doubtful cases (Timm Aircraft Corp. v. Byram, 34 Ca1.2d 
632, 638 [213 P.2d 715] ; Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 30 Ca1.2d 610, 
621 [184 P.2d 879]), but the existence of such right is not 
controlling. No one would contend that a warehouseman 
was the owner of government property stored with him, or 
that a rcpair shop proprietor was the owner of government 
automobiles brought to him for repairs, even though their 
possessory interests in such government property were profit-
able to them. In accord with such common understanding, the 
assessor himself in the present eases did not assess to plaintiffs 
government property supplied to them by the government to 
enable them to perform their contracts. 
[10] Defendants now contend, however, that it is immate-
rial who has title so long as the essential economics of the 
transaction remain the same. What difference, they ask, should 
it make that in one case the government may supply tools 
and material already owned by it, whereas in another it re-
quires the contractor to acquire tools and material that imme-
diately become government property, and in still another title 
l'emains in the contractor until the goods are delivered and 
tIle tools disposed of, if in all three cases the contractor receives 
essentially the same compensation for performing essentially 
the same services T Although there may be no difference 
of practical significance if the contract is carried out as 
planned, there may be a vital difff'rence in the event of 
breach or termination. (See United States v. Ansonia B/'(u.~ 
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&: Copper Co., 218 U.S. 452, 471 [31 S.Ot. 49, 54 hEel. 1107] ; 
In re Read-York, Inc., 152 F.2d 313, 316.) In one case the 
government as owner has the right to do with the propert.\· 
as it pleases subject only to such limitations as the contract 
imposes; in the other it is the taxpayer who has such right 
flubjcct only to such limilatiows. However irrelevant such 
considerations might be to the application of a tax on the use 
or possession of property, they are not irrelevant to the appli-
cation of an ad valorem tax on the property itself. 
[11] Although in any given case the impact of a use tax 
and a property tax might appear identical, they are not the 
same thing, and we cannot sustain a property tax here on the 
ground that the Legislature could constitutionally provide for 
the levy of a tax of equal amount under a different scheme. 
To be valid a use or possession tax would have to apply to all 
tax exempt property so as not to discriminate against the 
private use or possession of property owned by the United 
States, and it is for the Legislature, not the court, to determine 
whether such a nondiscriminatory tax on possessory interests 
in tax exempt personal property should be adopted and to 
determine the measure of such a tax. 
The question remains whether plaintiffs retained such an 
interest in any or aU of the property so that they were in fact 
the owners for tax purposes despite the clauses in the various 
contracts vesting title in the United States. [12] A title 
clause standing alone is not conclusive of ownership for tax 
purposes when it appears that the taxpayer retains the essen-
tial indicia of ownership (American Motors Corp. v. City of 
Kenosha, 274 Wis. 315 [80 N.W.2d 863, 367], aff'd 356 U.S. 
21 [78 S.Ot. 559, 2 L.Ed. 2d 578] ; C. C. Moore &: Co., Engi-
neers v. Quinn, 149 Cal.App.2d 666, 670 [308 P.2d 781]) or 
that the government title is for security only. (Timm Ai,'-
craft Corp. v. Byram, 84 Ca1.2d 632, 638 [213 P.2d 715], and 
cases cited.) Accordingly, it is necessary to examine the terms 
of the contracts to determine whether plaintiffs retained rights 
in the property inconsistent with its ownership by the United 
States for tax purposes. 
[18] The title clause of a typical cost-plus-fix ed-fee con-
tract provides that title to personal property acquired by the 
contractor passed to the government" (1) in the case of such 
property which is purchased by tlle cOllt/'al'1or for 111C per-
formance of this contract, upon dcliv('l'Y to the contractor at 
the contractor's plant or at the plant of the supplier on f.o.b. 
) 
) 
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purchases if the Naval Inspector at the contractor's plant 
shall have given his approval or (2) in the case of property not 
so purchased, upon the allocation thereof to the contract by 
the commencement by the contractor of processIng or use' 
thereof or otherwise. Such passage and vesting of title shall 
not impair any right which the Government might otherwise 
have under this contract, including but not limited to th~ 
right to reject any supplies hereunder, and shall not relieve 
the contractor of any of its obligations under this contract." 
After title passed, such property was treated in essentially 
the same manner as government property supplied to the con-
tractor directly by the government for use in carrying out 
the contract. It 'was to be used "by the contractor for the 
performance of this contract or of other contracts with" the 
government, and with certain limitations the risk of loss was 
borne by the government. The contractor retained DO bent>-
ficial interest other than the right of use in carrying out its 
contract. Scrap or other property no longer needed was sold 
under close government supervision and the proceeds applied 
to the reduction of payments owing to the contractor from the 
government. If the contract was completed or terminated in 
whole or in part, property not already delivered to the govern-
ment was either disposed of as the government directed for 
the government's sole benefit or made available for further 
use in performing other contracts. The government could and 
did remove its property at any time it saw fit, and even if 
such removal constituted a violation of the contractor's right 
to use the property, it does not appear that the contractor 
could prevent it or pursue other than purely contract remedies 
for the breach. Throughout pIa:inti1fs' operations under the 
contracts the government exercised control fully consistent 
with its ownership of the property involved, and the trial 
court found on the basls of substantial evidence that its use 
was "under the close, direct and watchful immediate super-
vision and control of the representatives of the United States. " 
Accordingly, in the case of property supplied by the govern-
ment and property to which it took title under the cost-plus-
fixed-fee contracts, plaintiffs neither secured nor retained the 
essential indicia of ownership and were therefore not the 
owners of such property for tax purposes. 
The foregoing discussion with respect to government sup-
plied property under cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts also applies 
to government property supplied uuder separate agreements 
for use by the plaintiffs generally in performing their con-
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tracts and to government property suppljpd for pprforming 
fixed-price contracts. 
Contractor-acquired property under fixed-price contracts, 
however, is treated in some respects differently, and requires 
separate. discussion. Only plaintiff Aerojet had fixed-price 
contracts. A typical title clause provided: 
.. (1) Upon the payment of any progress payment to the 
Contractor under this contract, legal and equitable title to all 
materials, assemblies, subassemblies, parts, inventories, work 
in process, non-durable tools, completed work and other prop-
erty acquired, produced or allocated by the Contractor for the 
performance of this contract shall vest absolutely in the Gov-
ernment forthwith upon acquisition, production or allocation 
by the Contractor of such property for such performance. 
Such passage and vesting of title shall not relieve the Con-
tractor or the Government of any of their respective rights or 
obligations under this contract, nor shall it affect the respon-
sibility of the Contractor in the event of loss or destruction of 
or damage to property. 
" (2) Property, title to which is or hereafter may become 
vested in the Government under the provisions of this Section 
may be (i) incorporated in supplies to be furnished hereunder, 
(ii) disposed of by the Contractor as obsolete, worn out, or 
damaged, (iii) altered from time to time, (iv) expended in the 
production of such supplies. To the extent any such property 
is not incorporated in supplies delivered hereunder, or dis-
posed of as obsolete, worn out or damaged, or expended in the 
production of such supplies, title to such property shan pass 
to and vest in the Contractor when such property is no longer 
necessary or useful for the performance of this contract, sub-
ject, in the case of termination, to the provisions of the Sec-
tions hereof entitled, C Termination for Convenience of the 
Government' and 'Default.' " 
Under the termination and default clauses the government 
could retain title and. assume possession or otherwise direct 
the disposition of the property. 
[14] Under normal operations the distinction between the 
treatment of contractor-acquired property under fixed-price 
contracts and fixed-fee contracts was that in the former case 
the contractor had the right to dispose of or receive title to 
property no longer useful or necessary in the performance of 
the contract whereas in the latter case the government retained 
such rights; in the former the risk of loss was borne by the 
contractor, and in the latter, by the government. These dis-
) 
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tinctions, however, are not inconsistent with the government's 
ownership of the property for tax purposes during the crucial 
period whcn title was vestcd in it. Placing the risk of loss 
on the contractor benefits the government, not the contracto1", 
and is not by itself inconsistent with government ownership. 
(U1lited States v. Ansonia Brass d': C. Co., 218 U.S. 452, 466-
467 [31 S.Ct. 49, 54 L.Ed. 1107].) While the property was 
still useful or necessary for the performance of the contract it 
could only be used in performance of the contract unless the 
government otherwise directed, and in practice the govern-
ment exercised the same supervision and control over the dis-
posal of scrap material under fixed-price contracts as it did 
under fixed-fee contracts. 
In some respects the problem is the converse of tllat pre-
sented in Timm Aircraft Corp. v. Byram, 34 Cal.2d 632 [213 
P.2d 715]. In that case title to advance payments made to the 
contractor by the government was held to be in the contractor 
for tax purposes despite the government's right to reclaim 
those funds not necessary for the contract's performance and 
the balance of the funds in the event of the contract's termi-
nation. Conversely, in the present case, the parties have 
provided for the passage of title to materials before the deliv-
ery of the finished products, and there is a provision revesting 
title to unnecessary materials in the contractor. Just as in 
the Timm case, where the contractor received substantial 
interests in the advance payments before they were fully 
earned, so in this case the government received substantial 
interests in the property on making a progress payment, inter-
ests it would not have received in the absence of the title 
clause. It did not have solely a lien or security interest that 
could be defeated by the discharge of the obligation secured 
or whose enforcement might entail a sale terminating its 
interest in the property. To serve its best interests, the gov-
ernment could terminate the contracts in whole or in part 
and take possession of its property, and it could do likewise 
in the event of the contractor's default, whether or not such 
default constituted a breach of contract. In any such event. 
it was not dependent on the performance of the contractor's 
obligations to it to protect its riglJts, for the property was 
already its. 
In American Motors Corp. v. City of Kel1o.~ha, 274 Wis. 315 
[80 N.W.2d 363, 366-367], invoked by defendants, the court 
interpreted a fixed-price contract similar to the ones involved 
here and stated that "the Company's right to acquire [!'nr 
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Hself] or dispose of the property [title to whi<>b had passed to 
t.he government.] is suhject to no restriclion, the only rPlluire-
ment hf'int:r that II. J1ri"f> for such aeqllisi1ion bf> a~rf>('(l upon 
with Ihe Contrading" Officer and 111e amollnt illYo]YC'd I", paill 
or l'reditf'tl to the GoycrJ1ment as the Ofti,'C'}' may dired." It 
coneluded that "the unrestrIcted right of the Company under 
the contract to acquire and dispose of the property and the 
risk of loss are elements of ownership inconsistent with the 
. vesting of "title in the Government as would render the prop-
"erty immune from taxation. " The decision in the American 
Motors case, however, appears to have overlooked the fact 
that the contractor's right to acquire or dispose of the prop-
erty other than scrap could only be exercised at the option of 
the government. Until such option was exercised in favor 
of the contractor, it, like Aeroj('t, had no right to acquire or 
dispose of government property. Moreover, as point(>d out 
above, the mere fact that the risk of loss was borne by the 
contractor is not inconsistent with government ownership. 
We conclude that plaintiffs were not the owners of any of 
the property here involved for the purposes of ad valorem 
personal property taxation under present California statutes. 
The judgments are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
McCOMB, J.-I concur in the affirmance of the judgments 
for the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Traynor in the major. 
ity opinion and also for the reason that the property here 
involved upon which defendants had attempted to levy and 
collect taxes was not the property of plaintiffs. 
Article XIII of the state Constitution authorizes the tax-
ation of "property." The term "property" in the broadest 
meaning is ownership; the unrestricted and exclusive right to 
a thing; the right to dispose of a thing in every legal way, 
to possess it, to use it, and' to exclude everyone else from 
interfering with it. (Black, Law DictioMry (4th ed. 1951), 
p.1382.) 
In Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Byram, 57 Cal.App.2d 311, 3]7 
[134 P.2d 15], Mr. Justice Bishop says, "A common character-
istic of a property right, is that it may be disposed of, trans-
ferred to another." 
In Yuba River ]>ower Co. v. Net'ada Irr. Disi., 207 Cal. 52], 
524 [279 P. 128], the definition of property is given as "the 
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exclusive right of possession, enjoying, and disposing of a 
thing; it is 'the right and interest which a man has in lands 
and chattels, to the exclusion of others' ; and the term is suffi-
ciently comprehensive to include every species of estate, real 
or personal." 
In view of the foregoing definitions, the property involved 
in the instant cases was not property of plainti1fs since it did 
not have the attributes as defined above. 
Plainti:ffs could not use any part of the property without 
the consent of the government. Neither did plainti1fs have 
the ownership, that is, the unrestricted right to possess it, 
to use it, or to exclude everyone else from interfering with it. 
Plainti1fs did not have the power to dispose of it, to transfer 
it, to pledge or to hypothecate it. The property, 80 far as 
plainti1fs were concerned, had no exchangeable value and did 
not go to make up part of plaintiffs' estate. Therefore, since 
the property in question was not the property of plaintiffs, it 
was not properly taxable by defendants. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied November 
19,1958. 
